



**REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION**

DECISION

ON REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT ON APPOINTMENT OF CEAZ MEMBERS AND SECRETARIES PROPOSED BY DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ALBANIA AND CEAZ MEMBERS PROPOSED BY SOCIALIST MOVEMENT FOR INTEGRATION FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS OF JUNE 30, 2019

The Central Elections Commission, in its meeting on 23.05.2019, with the participation of

Klement	ZGURI -	Chairman
Denar	BIBA -	Deputy Chairman
Bledar	SKËNDERI-	Member
Edlira	JORGAQI-	Member
Rezarta	BITRI-	Member

Reviewed the issue with the following

OBJECT: On reviewing the request for appointment of members and secretaries of CEAZs proposed by Democratic Party of Albania and members of CEAZs proposed by Socialist Movement for Integration, for local government elections of June 30, 2019.

LEGAL REFERENCE: Article 23, paragraph 1, letter a, Article 29, of Law No. 10019, dated 29.12.2008 "Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania", as amended.

After reviewing the submitted documentation and proposals submitted by political parties,

NOTES

The Central Election Commission (hereinafter referred to as the CEC), with Decision No. 18, dated 01.02.2019, and Decision No. 19, dated 01.02.2019, has determined the political parties that will propose the members of the Commissions of Election Administration Zones, to be established for local government elections of June 30, 2019.

Decision no. 657

Decision date 23.05.2019

Time 11:00



On appointment of members and secretaries of CEAZs proposed by Democratic Party of Albania and members of CEAZs proposed by Socialist Movement for Integration, for local government elections of June 30, 2019.

The proposals for members and secretaries of CEAZs were submitted only by the Socialist Party of Albania within the legal deadline set in the above by-laws. No proposals were submitted by the other political parties to fill the CEAZs vacancies, neither within the legal deadline nor beyond it. In this case, pursuant to Article 29, item 5 of the Electoral Code, Article 9, paragraph 4, of Instruction no. 2, dated 25.02.2009 "On the Organization and Functioning of the Commission of Electoral Administration Zone", as amended, the CEC appoints members and secretaries to fill vacancies that arise in the CEAZ. As a result, pursuant to Article 23, Article 29, paragraph 5, Article 30, Article 31, of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania, with decision no.141 dated 09.04.2019, the CEC decided to appoint members and secretaries of CEAZs.

On May 20, 2019, the "Democratic Party" (hereinafter referred to as DP) and the "Socialist Movement for Integration" Party (hereinafter referred to as SMI) sent a written request to the CEC (through documents with prot.no.3994-4020) demanding, pursuant to article 29, item 5, second paragraph of the Electoral Code, that CEAZ members nominated by the CEC be replaced with the members proposed by them. DP submitted 268 candidates, out of whom 225 candidates for CEAZ members and 43 candidates for secretaries of CEAZs. There were no candidates submitted for the secretary of CEAZ no. 20 and the CEAZ secretary no. 56. Over 30% of the nominated candidates belong to each gender. The candidates proposed by DP for members and secretaries of the CEAZs meet the requirements of Article 30 and Article 31 of the Electoral Code, except for two candidates who do not meet the criteria established in Article 31, letter "ç".

SMI has submitted 90 candidates for CEAZ members. The candidates proposed by the Socialist Movement for Integration for CEAZ members meet the requirements of Article 30 and Article 31 of the Electoral Code, except for the candidate proposed for members of CEAZ no.15, that does not meet the criteria established in Article 31 , letter "ç".

On May 23, 2019, the CEC in its meeting reached the decision "On appointment of members and secretaries of the CEAZs proposed by the Democratic Party of Albania and members of the CEAZs proposed by the Socialist Movement for Integration, for local government elections of June 30, 2019

During the meeting, the Permanent Representative of Democratic Party in the CEC justified the proposal by claiming, among others, (cited in the minutes of the meeting):

"Please let me briefly discuss the act as it is an act that has a broad public significance and comes as a response to a need and emergency that Democratic Party and United Opposition have referred to the Central Election Commission regarding the exercising of our legal right to fill the vacancies of commissions of election zone administration members. According to provisions of Article 28 and 29 and particularly Article 29, point 5, which recognizes the right to the subjects eligible to nominate a member of the Commission of Election Administration Zone even if they fail to submit a nomination within the legal deadline at the moment of establishment of these commissions, they can do it, without obstructing the general election procedure, at another moment, i.e. up to 30 days before the election date, in order to exercise their legal right of filling these vacancies by submitting these candidates.



The United Opposition has chosen to exercise this legal right in order to respond to the need to monitor the electoral process and to be transparent in every step and every aspect of it as there are many reports on violations, some of them are reported to you, but the majority, are reported in an institutional way by the opposition, which confirms that every step of the election process in the commissions, especially in second level of election administration commissions, but also other chains of the entire election structure, are filled with illegitimacy and this certainly serves to a clear purpose and a clear design of the state party in power, which, despite the fact that it has created opportunities in these elections, has designed the circumstances to compete alone once again in the race, once again by itself, by creating a process, managing a process filled with illegitimacy- illegitimacy which ranges from the violation of deadlines in every step of the electoral process, to attempts to appoint a 'facade' opposition in order to replace the real opposition and to create the impression that there will be elections in this country".

After reviewing the submitted documentation, considering the circumstances when these two requests / proposals are submitted, the Central Election Commission estimates that in order to fully comply with the provisions set out in the Electoral Code, the entire legislative spectrum should be analyzed related to the establishment of Commissions of Electoral Administration Zones (CEAZs) as well as other relevant legal framework that impacts the way the CEAZ is composed.

DP and SMI base their proposals on articles 28 and 29/5 of the Electoral Code. According to Article 28:

"1. The decision to establish the CEAZ is taken by the CEC *no later than 90 days prior to the election date.*

2. **Political parties** propose relevant candidates for CEAZ members no later than 15 days before the deadline provided for in point 1 of this article.

Whereas according to article 29, item 1 and 5, which are relevant to the case:

1. The CEAZ shall be composed of 7 members and a secretary, who shall be appointed by the CEC according to the following procedure:

- a) two members shall be proposed by **the main party of the parliamentary majority**, two members shall be proposed **by the main party of the parliamentary opposition**, one member shall be proposed **by the second party of the parliamentary majority** and one member shall be proposed **by the second party of the parliamentary opposition**. If political balance is not reached in accordance with this letter, the respective group shall be compensated with the candidacies of the main party until a political balance between the majority and opposition is reached;
- b) in half of the CEAZs, the seventh member shall be proposed by the largest party of the parliamentary majority, while in the other half this member shall be proposed by the largest party of the parliamentary opposition....



[...]

5. If the political parties of the parliamentary majority and the parliamentary opposition that have the right to submit their candidacies for CEAZ fail to exercise this right by the deadline established in point 2 of article 28 of this Code, this right shall be automatically transferred to the parties next in rank according to the number of seats in the Assembly, within the respective grouping. When this is not possible, proposals are made according to letter "a" of point 1 of this article. **If these parties fail also to propose members, the CEC appoints the CEAZ members upon its own initiative until the required number of members for decision-making is reached.**

The members appointed upon the CEC's initiative stay in office until the appointment of members proposed by political parties, in accordance with this article. The replacement shall take place no later than 30 days from the election date.

In the event of early elections, the replacement takes place no later than 5 days from the election date. Procedures for the selection and training of citizens that may be appointed on CEC's own initiative are set out in a special instruction of the CEC."

According to the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Party at the CEC (quoted according to the minutes of the meeting): "legal provisions ... give the unconditional right to the United Opposition in this case to submit their candidacies in the Electoral Administration Zone Commission ... as an unconditional legal right granted to the opposition by article 29, point 5...".

The CEC estimates that Article 29, which is the main legal basis to which DP and SMI is referred, is only one of the provisions of the Electoral Code that governs the establishment and functioning of the second and third level election management bodies, respectively CEAZs and the Voting Center Commissions (VCCs), or the Ballot Counting Teams (GNV).

The Electoral Code itself is a codification of the election law and the issues it has foreseen in years. Article 29 should not be considered as detached and as a single one, but it should be assessed as part of the entire Electoral Code, so that the purpose of Article 29 is in line with the purpose of the Electoral Code itself. As the Supreme Court of Israel states, "*A fragment of the law cannot stand alone. It is a part of a legal body. It integrates into it so that the law is harmonious. Anyone who interprets part of the law interprets the law as a whole*" (Supreme Court of Israel, *Efrat v. Directorate of Population Census H.C.693 / 91 case*)

The CEC, in this case, should interpret Article 29 in the light of the spirit of the Electoral Code as a whole. Every interpretation system / technique aims to address the relationship between text and context, or, to put it differently, between words in the text and the spirit of the law. The aim of interpretation of a legal text is to understand the purpose for which the text serves, as in the end, the law is nothing more than an instrument for achieving a social goal. It aims, on the one hand, to ensure the development of social life of a community and, on the other hand, to protect human rights and social justice. The final purpose of a legal text is determined by the relationship between the subjective elements (the real purpose of the author) and the objective ones (the scope of the law within the legislative framework of the state). The greatest weight is on objective goals; the past influences the present but does not define it; it leads it towards the present but does not enslave it! Every law has a purpose without which it would make no sense. This purpose, *or ratio legis*, consists of the objectives, intentions, interests, values, policies and functions for which the law is designed to implement. The objective purpose of a law implies the



interests, values, objectives, policies and functions that the law should implement in a democracy. **The objective criteria at the moment of interpretation are the ones that determine the purpose of the law.** The objective purpose of a law is deduced from the **nature of the issues** governed by this law.¹

If we refer to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence, the latter qualified the Convention as "a living instrument that should be interpreted in the light of today's conditions" (*Tyrer v. United Kingdom case, April 25, 1978*). In its interpretation process, the ECHR often emphasizes the **scope** and the **purpose** of the European Convention when justifying a certain interpretation. The ECHR has confirmed this in its jurisprudence by claiming that it does not consider itself bound by the understanding of the parties at the time of ratification. The essential document in establishing the object and purpose, according to ECHR, must be the preamble (*for more information please refer to Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland case, dated 28.03 1990*).

The interpretation of an article by referring to and taking into account other articles of the same law or code (systematic interpretation)- all of which guided by the purpose and objectives of the law (teleological interpretation) is the most common interpretation not only used by the ECHR, but also by the Albanian Constitutional Court².

The teleological interpretation starts from the assumption that the legislation is reasonably designed for a particular purpose or that the legislation serves as an instrument to achieve "certain legal, social or economic purposes". According to this method, any interpretation should be consistent with this particular purpose. Said it differently: "Understanding of a legal rule should be established based on the good which the rule intends to promote or the evil it seeks to prevent." This means that the consequences of interpreting a legal text in a certain way should contribute to the realization of the goals and objectives of this legal text rather than the narrow and pragmatic interests of the subjects of the law.

The CEC expresses the conviction that the whole Electoral Code has been established and conceived on the basis of the principle of participation, inclusiveness and **balance of political parties participating in the elections.**

And this is understandable and logical by closely relating it to the **purpose** stated in Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Electoral Code expressly which explicitly provides that:

"1. This Code aims to define the rules for the preparation, holding, administration, supervision and announcement of the election result for the parliamentary elections, for local government elections and referenda".

Referring to text in Article 29 of the Electoral Code, the CEC argues that the use of terms such as "the main party of the parliamentary majority", "the main party of the parliamentary opposition",

¹ Aharon Barak, *The Judge in a Democracy*, Princeton University Press, 2006.

² Please refer to Decision no.2, dated 18.01.2005, Decision no. 25, dated 05.12.2008, etc.



"the second party of the parliamentary majority" and "the second party of the parliamentary opposition "Or, in other words, highlighting only of the phrase" parliamentary party" in the text, without relating it to anything else (such as parliamentary parties registered in the elections) is understandable as it refers to the time the CEAZs are established, i.e. no later than 90 days from the election date, while, according to article 64, point 1 of the Electoral Code, "Any political party must submit a request to register as an electoral subject at the CEC no later than 70 days before the election date. "So, the legislator reasonably refers to the subjects of the Electoral Code in this case only as a" parliamentary party "(majority or opposition) since the time of establishment of CEAZs is earlier than the registration of political parties in elections. This explains the fact why the CEC does not consider it reasonable to change Decision No. 18, dated 01.02.2019, and its Decision No. 19, dated 01.02.2019, through which the CEC has defined the political parties that will propose the members of the Commissions of Electoral Administration Zones that will be established for local government elections of June 30, 2019. These individual acts of the CEC are correct given the time they were taken and their amendment or leaving them in force, has no impact on the current situation.

On the other hand, it is evident that, after the expiration of the 70 day deadline for the registration of electoral subjects, the lawmaker starts to change the terminology of the Code; he no longer says "parliamentary parties", but starts with articles that follow Article 29 and changes the terminology by qualifying them as "electoral subject registered in the election.

Article 29 of the Code is the norm that governs the appointment of CEAZ members, but Article 32 is a norm regulating how they are dismissed and released. There are two articles that conclude the same logical segment. But unlike Article 29, which is, however, a correct regulation of the relationship that sets a time frame of no later than 90 days prior to the election date, Article 32, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this is equally clear when it provides that:

Members and secretary of the CEAZ shall be released from duty upon the CEC decision when:

d) the electoral subject that has proposed them requires their replacement.

3. The member and the secretary of the CEAZ are released / dismissed from office by the CEC, with CEC initiative or with the proposal of the electoral subjects, only for the reasons provided in this article.

The law, *as the essence of reason*, cannot create such absurd situations when CEAZ members, while appointed by certain parliamentary parties, cannot be replaced or dismissed by them. Rather, it is easily understandable, in terms of the principle of participation, inclusion and balancing of **political parties participating in the elections** and the main mission of the Code which is the conduct of the elections (and not their failure or sabotage), even though up to 90 days before the election date (only) certain parliamentary political parties have the right to propose members of the CEAZ after the deadline of "no later than 70 days before the election date" provided for in Article 64 of the Code Election officials. The rights to propose their appointments, release and dismissals are of the political parties that at the same time enjoy the status of electoral subjects.

According to Article 2 of the Electoral Code, the "parliamentary party" is the political party that has won and owns at least one seat in the Assembly from the previous elections, while "electoral subjects" are the political parties, coalitions and candidates proposed by the voters, as well as



the candidates for mayors of the local government bodies, registered in compliance with this Code.

As DP and SMI did not register in the CEC within the deadline provided by the Electoral Code, they do not enjoy the status of electoral subjects.

The CEC estimates that Article 29 is inextricably linked to Articles 36, 95 and 96 of the Electoral Code, which regulate the composition of the VCC and BCT. According to Article 36, point 1, "The VCC is established according to the way and criteria in Article 29 of this Code, for any type of elections ...". As a result, in an absurd assumption where the CEC will read Article 29 as isolated from the other articles of the Electoral Code and in full negligence of the purpose of the Electoral Code, the result would be that DP and SMI would have members even in VCC.

With the same (lack of) logic, the establishment of the BCT would also follow, as Article 95, point 2 provides that "The Counting Teams are composed of four members, where in any case one member is appointed on the proposal of the party to which the Chair of the CEAZ belongs, one member is appointed on the proposal of the political party to which the Deputy Chair belongs, whereas the third member is proposed by the parties of the ruling majority and the fourth member is appointed on the proposal of the opposition parties that have the right to propose members of the Counting Teams for the respective EAZs, according to the procedure specified in article 96 of this Code.

"In practical terms, DP and SMI, two parties that were not registered to participate in the elections would also have a ballot counting team members.

Luckily- although when the Electoral Code was drafted, it was not possible to foresee such a situation when the two largest parliamentary parties of the opposition give up parliamentary mandates and refuse to run in elections- the legislator again foresees the provision of Article 96 according to which "The political parties that have the right to propose the third and the fourth member of the Counting Teams, with the exception of parties that propose the Chair and deputy Chair of the CEAZ, are determined by drawing lots at the CEC between the list of political parties of the parliamentary majority and the list of parties of the parliamentary opposition that are registered in the elections and that have won no fewer than two seats in the preceding elections to the Assembly".

At this point, both in respect of the systematic and teleological interpretation of the Electoral Code norms and the reverse logical interpretation, it results that CEAZ, VCC and BCC members can only be proposed by political parties of the parliamentary majority and parliamentary opposition parties that are registered in the elections.

Article 6 of the Electoral Code provides that "Any political party or candidate that is proposed by the voters and is **registered with the CEC as an electoral subject** has the right to appoint one observer to the CEAZ, the VCC and to each table of the Ballot Counting Centre after the registration of the candidate/s for the respective electoral zone, or after the submission of a multi-name list.

"How can one think that a legislator that, with no doubt, denied the right to appoint observers to the parties not registered in elections, could grant them the right to propose members in CEAZs, VCCs and BCCs ?! The reason is clear: parties not registered in elections do not have a personal, direct and real interest to enjoy such rights.



In every OSCE-ODIHR report on elections in Albania it is acknowledged that "despite the shortcomings, the legal framework could provide the basis for democratic elections.³ "Under no circumstances would these reports state that unless the Electoral Code provided a guarantee of the right promulgated by its articles. The fact that the Code provides that the right to appeal to the Electoral College against the CEC decisions belongs only to the electoral subjects if the CEC decision has violated their legitimate interests, is a clear indication that at this point, the claim at this stage of the electoral process, by DP and SMI, two parties that are not electoral subjects, simply have no connection with any legitimate interest of them which has been violated.

This is finally confirmed even by the non-eligibility of the parties that are not electoral subjects, to appeal these requests in court.

Article 145 of the Electoral Code that regulates the right of appeal in court, provides that:

"Electoral subjects have the right to appeal to the Electoral College of the Court of Appeals in Tirana against CEC decisions which affect their legal interests, by the deadline established in article 152 of this Code. Individuals or political parties whose request to be registered as an electoral subject have been rejected also have the right to appeal according to this article.

The Electoral College explicitly states in relation to article 29 of the Electoral Code:

*"Article 29 of the Electoral Code, provides the formula/ gives the modalities on appointment of members and establishment of CEAZs which , as a rule, is done through the proposals of the electoral subjects (that have the qualities of parliamentary majority or minority) by creating a political balance."*⁴

Even in this Electoral College decision it is clear that in order to have the right to propose members of the CEAZ, you should both qualify as the electoral subject and as parliamentary majority or minority.

Then we logically go to the notion of ELECTORAL SUBJECT within the meaning of the Electoral Code, as follows:

According to article 2/20

20. Electoral subjects" are political parties, coalitions and candidates proposed by the voters, as well as candidates for mayor of local government bodies, who have **registered in accordance with this Code.**

According to provisions of article 63, "Electoral subjects and candidates" of the Electoral Code, **the electoral subject is a political party or a coalition of political parties that submit a list of candidates** according to the rules provided for in this Code.

³ For more information please refer to final Report of OSCE/ODIHR Mission on Observation of Elections 2015, 2017.

⁴ Decision no. 29, dated 10.07.2015 of Electoral College, taken from "Summary of Electoral College Decisions", page 490-491, OSCE Publication, 2016.



When analyzing the above articles of the Electoral Code, one can easily conclude that only the participation in the electoral process, competition in the electoral process according to the rules provided by the Electoral Code gives the quality of the electoral subject.

Regarding the above, it is obvious that the petitioning the political subjects, do not meet the legal criteria to be an electoral subject in the election process of June 30, 2019, because the political subjects:

- are not registered in the elections of June 30, 2019, a world recognized fact;
- have not proposed their representatives in order to meet the obligations provided for in Article 29 and not only that of the Electoral Code;
- have not presented any interest or made any approach to be part of this electoral process, except for the request in question.

Regarding the above, we underline that the requesting political subject does not meet one of the two criteria at the same time, stated in the Electoral College, therefore does not enjoy the quality of the electoral subject, so that they can fall under the provisions of article 29 of the Electoral Code.

Under these conditions, the CEC considers that the political subjects that have submitted the request have no direct legitimate interest to be part of the electoral process it publicly refuses to be part of.

The interest must be direct, personal and genuine. This condition requires the fulfillment of a right that is directly related to the entity that filed the claim in any other competent body of the state administration, including the CEC in this case.

No one can approach a body to ensure that someone's rights are observed and protected- such is the case of two political parties that do not participate in elections, and appear as defenders of electoral political parties and citizens' interests, while practically they do not represent them in the elections.

The constant public statements of the DP of the SMI that "there will be no elections on June 30, 2019" or "the elections will not take place" openly contradict the subject of the norm established as a legal basis in the political subject's request and with the purpose of the Electoral Code in general .

Political parties are primarily the organization for the preparation of elections. As such they create and shape the will of the people as electoral organization⁵.

Abuse with a right refers to a case when a subject exercising his or her right cannot use it as a pretext (*an external cause presented as an excuse, in order to hide or cover the true reasons of event, action or something else, a false argument used by someone*) with the sole aim of causing damage (and in this specific case the election process in the country is damaged).

⁵ Case "Political Party Funds III" 1966, German Constitutional Court.



The CEC cannot approve the submitted request, as, it was stated above that requesting political entities do not possess two crucial elements at the same time: the status of the electoral subject and the quality of the parliamentary majority or minority as provided in the Electoral Code.

If the CEC refuses the request filed by the political subject, **the political subject that does not run in elections, none of its rights shall not be affected such as: the right to elect, the right to be elected, the right to vote, the right to participate in the elections.**

No right is violated, on the contrary, the CEC gives special protection to the electoral process.

It is the CEC task to take care and manage the electoral process, considering the principle of loyalty to the state (Strasbourg Court in the case of *Tanase v. Moldova* para. 166).

The decision to reject the lists, according to the proposal of the petitioning party, DP and SMI, is in full compliance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Code of Administrative Procedures, which provides for the Proportionality Principle as follows:

1. Any administrative action which, in order to protect the public interest or the rights of others, may limit an individual right or may affect legitimate interests, shall be taken based on the principle of proportionality.
2. The administrative action is consistent with the principle of proportionality only when this action is:
 - a) necessary to achieve the goal set by law and reaches it through the instruments and measures that least affect the rights or legitimate interests of the party;
 - b) appropriate to achieve the purpose provided by law; and
 - c) in fair proportion to the need that dictated it.

The CEC decision is proportional and consists in exercising the appropriate measure of power in such a way as to ensure an appropriate and necessary action in relation to the circumstances of the fact by striving to strike the right balance between values, interests and situations of this case. The CEC decision as an administrative act is measure that aims to take into account the public interest, the public interest to vote.

The law cannot be isolated from the reality it is associated with and is set up as a whole normative, independent and self-determined system. This means that Article 29 should not be regarded as detached and as a single one, it should be assessed as part of the whole Electoral Code, so that the purpose of Article 29 is in line with the purpose of the Electoral Code, so that the election administration can organize the electoral process.

The case law of the European Court of Human Rights is rich with decisions which are specifically related to the right provided for in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.

In a number of decisions, this court issued statements by taking into consideration various aspects such as the meaning and purpose, the principles of interpretation, the active aspect of the right to vote, as well as the **importance of the historical and political context**, as follows:



"For the purpose of implementing Article 3, any election legislation should be reviewed in the light of the political evolution of the country in question, so that characteristics that would be unacceptable in the context of a system may be justified in the context of another, but also to explain any evolution at the level of demand, depending on the period under review. Some of these cases are: (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium PODKOLZINA v. Lithuania).

Based on the above argument, the CEC considers that Democratic Party of Albania and Socialist Movement for Integration Party, by not registering in the elections of 30 June 2019, do not meet the legal criteria to be an electoral subject in the election process of June 30, 2019 and as a result, cannot propose at this stage of electoral process, members of CEAZ (and respectively for VCC and BCT).

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS

The Central Elections Commission, based on article 23, item 1, letter a, article 29, of the law No.10019, dated 29.12.2008 "The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania", as amended,

DECIDED:

1. To reject the request for appointment of members and secretaries of CEAZs, proposed by the Democratic Party of Albania.
2. To reject the request for appointment of members and secretaries of CEAZs, proposed by the Socialist Movement for Integration Party.
3. This decision comes immediately into force.
4. This decision can be appealed in the Electoral College, Tirana Court of Appeals, within 5 days from its publication.

Klement	ZGURI -	Chairman
Denar	BIBA -	Deputy Chairman
Bledar	SKËNDERI-	Member

Decision no. 657

Decision date 23.05.2019 Time 11:00

On appointment of members and secretaries of CEAZs proposed by Democratic Party of Albania and members of CEAZs proposed by Socialist Movement for Integration, for local government elections of June 30, 2019.



Edlira	JORGAQI-	Member
Rezarta	BITRI-	Member

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